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ABSTRACT 
This paper challenges dominant understandings of ‘rising powers’ by developing a decentred, 
relational account of Russia and China in Central Asia. We ask whether Moscow and Beijing’s 
regional integrative strategies do not guide, but are rather led by, everyday interactions among 
Russian and Chinese actors, and local actors in Central Asia. Rising powers, as a derivative of 
‘Great Powers’, are frequently portrayed as structurally comparable units that concentrate 
power in their executives, fetishize territorial sovereignty, recruit client states, contest regional 
hegemony, and explicitly oppose the post-1945 international order. In contrast, we demonstrate 
that the centred discourse of Eurasian integration promoted by Russian and Chinese leaders is 
decentred by networks of business and political elites, especially with regard to capital 
accumulation. Adopting Homi K Bhabha’s notion of mimicry (subversion, hybridity) and J.C. 
Scott’s conception of mētis (local knowledge, agency), and using examples of Russian and 
Chinese investments and infrastructure projects in Central Asia, we argue that in order to 
understand centring discourse we must look to decentring practices at the periphery; that is, 
rising power is produced through on-going interactions between actors at the margins of the 
state’s hegemonic reach.  
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In the early twentieth century, British political geographer Halford Mackinder claimed that the 
centre of the Eurasian landmass was the ‘geographical pivot of history’. A century later, 
MacKinder’s assertion of the significance of Central Asia is once again seductive.1  New 
schemes to tessellate the region with communications and economic infrastructure abound, and 
the region’s two ‘rising powers’ – Russia and China – are the central actors in these 
developments. Beijing’s much-heralded Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) project, the land-
based component of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) launched in 2013, proposes a network 
of high-speed railways, airports and roads, as well as energy-related infrastructure that will link 
Chinese markets with European consumers.2  Russia, Central Asia’s post-imperial power, has 
championed the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), the region’s first common market, 
established in 2014 with the four post-Soviet states most closely aligned to Moscow 
(Kazakhstan, Belarus, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan).  
 
However, inherent within the notion of a ‘New Great Game’ are problematic assumptions of 
the perceived players (and, by extension, rising powers) as coherent, unitary, Westphalian 
actors who enact power upon their small Central Asian neighbours. MacKinder’s present-day 
disciples often overlook the confluence of old local rules with new offshore connections, which 
set the terms under which politico-military competition between states takes place.3  In fact, a 
great deal of the wider geopolitics of Central Asia may be obscured by an exclusive focus on 
the actions of Beijing and Bishkek, Moscow and Tashkent.   
 
We challenge this dominant narrative on the nature of rising state power along two lines. First, 
despite the image of rational, centralised, foreign policy-making processes desired by domestic 




but capital-owning elites, foreign and local companies, and labour. Second, rather than 
conceiving of power as a linear, zero-sum commodity, imposed by a dominant upon a 
subordinate actor, as is found in many studies of rising powers, we see power as produced 
relationally in specific situations through the practices of on-going interactions between locally 
situated actors. 
 
We follow these two lines of critique by developing a practice-based account of the 
international politics of Central Asia that begins with an understanding of state power as 
fundamentally fragmented and decentred. Processes of globalisation and the marketisation of 
state bureaucracies are driving this decentring of power in Russia and China away from 
Moscow and Beijing towards local actors operating at the state’s periphery. As a result, 
centrally articulated policy towards Central Asia is often novel, occasionally incoherent, and 
frequently employed to justify operations that have already occurred and over which the central 
state had limited control. ‘Decentring’ here is used not as a normative preference and strategy 
of government in the wake of New Public Management,4 but as an analytical conceptualization 
of the processes of state transformation wrought by the incorporation of market logic into state 
bureaucracies.5  
 
Drawing on earlier work which explored the political-economic and regime security 
imperatives of the decentred post-Soviet state,6 and which linked post-Western powers to 
postcolonial mimicry in Central Asia,7  we extend our analysis by demonstrating that the 
discursive claim to be a ‘rising’ or ‘great’ power is intertwined with and produced through 
decentred, localised practices of two types.  First, we identify practices of mimicry which are 
derived from the concept of Homi K. Bhabha and extended by L.H.M. Ling to refer to practices 




actors by subordinates.  Second we deploy the concept of mētis which J.C. Scott uses to denote 
everyday practices of local knowledge, ‘knack’, agency and subversion, especially with regard 
to capital accumulation. This interpretive framework enables us to foreground the relationship 
between the centred state discourse and decentred practices of Russian and Chinese actors in 
Central Asia. The Russian government’s discursive claim to great power status in Central Asia 
rests on the various local deals struck to create buy-in to the EAEU and bilateral Russian 
initiatives.   In the case of China, it is the SREB that provides symbolic cover for Chinese 
business’ capital accumulation and the creation of new labour markets and trade routes for its 
expanding economy.8 The decentred practices for both include the activities of elite inter-
personal power networks and agencies, semi-autonomous corporations and various ‘soft power’ 
organisations. These entities often operate independently of and sometimes in contradiction to 
central government policy, often requiring political leaders to make post hoc rationalisations 
of activities carried out under their auspices.  
 
In considering Russian and Chinese practices in Central Asia under the same framework, we 
do not wish to suggest equivalence. Clearly, the historical and colonial legacies of both states 
in the region, their relationships to Western models of political organisation, and the extents to 
which their state bureaucracies have adopted market principles, mean that they exhibit very 
different forms and degrees of mimicry, the more culturally and historically contingent of the 
two concepts we propose. Nevertheless, we seek to demonstrate that the decentred forms of 
power that interact with and produce the centred discourse are common to both Russia and 
China in Central Asia (and, indeed, potentially elsewhere). Rather than offering a 
straightforward comparison of Russian and Chinese practices, we present mimicry and mētis 




interactions among unequal actors across scales and borders, and thereby advance a more 
nuanced understanding of how states ‘rise’. 
 
 
The essay is structured in four parts. First, we consider the elite discourses of the EAEU and 
SREB as demonstrative of Moscow and Beijing’s self-projection as centred Westphalian actors; 
and, second, we advance a relational theory of rising powers, situated in conditions of 
globalisation and enacted through post-colonial practices of mimicry and mētis. Parts Three 
and Four illustrate our theory using case studies of Russian and Chinese investments and trans-
regional economic projects in Central Asia, evidenced in their commercial and political 
practices.   
 
1. Centred Projections of ‘Rising’ Power in Central Asia 
This section explores the centred discourses of Russian and Chinese policy-makers towards 
Central Asia, and argues that they are performative of parallel and competing grand strategies 
which ape one another in their claims to great power status (Russian: velikaya derzhavnost’. 
Chinese: da guo, 大国).  At the same time, as demonstrated below, these strategies effectively 
misrepresent decentred practice and power relations.   
Conventional analyses of Russia and China in Central Asia often present China as the 
dominant power: Russia as an economic actor has been displaced by an increasingly wealthy 
China.9  At first glance, these analyses appear correct: in Central Asia, Russian regional 
investment was overtaken by China in 2008.10 Nevertheless, it is misleading to suggest, as 
Mearsheimer does, that Russia is a ‘declining’ power – especially in the Central Asian 




and legacies, which provoke formal mimicry in business and politics and are the basis of the 
practical knowledge which sustains political-economic relations (mētis). The differing types 
of Russian and Chinese power are reflected in the discourses of Eurasian integration articulated 
by Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping. 
Since his first term in power, Putin has sought to promote integrative projects in the Eurasian 
region, and there have existed a number of institutional precursors to the EAEU.12 Treaties 
establishing the EAEU in its current form were signed by Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia in 
May 2014, and entered into force on 1 January 2015. Armenia and Kyrgyzstan’s accession 
came into force in January and August 2015 respectively. Thus, at the time of writing, the 
contemporary EAEU has been operative for about four years. Its economic agenda involves 
the removal of non-tariff barriers, the creation of common utilities markets, and the 
standardization of policies in such spheres as transport, public procurement and financial 
services.13 
 
The key text in which Putin articulates his vision for Eurasian integration is a 2011 article 
published in the newspaper Izvestiya. Here, Putin claimed that the project is ‘a historic 
milestone not only for our three countries, but for all states in the post-Soviet space’.14 The 
article links the various integrative projects initiated since the collapse of the USSR - the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Collective Security Treaty Organization 
(CSTO), the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) – in a teleological process 
culminating in the present-day EAEU. Five years later, in his 2016 keynote address at the St 
Petersburg Economic Forum, Putin set out a vision for the EAEU to act as an institutional 
‘bridge’ between Europe and Asia by seeking to form partnerships both with ‘Eastern’ 
countries, such as China, India, Iran and Pakistan, and with European countries.15 The speech 




enabling complex trading relations, conducting regulatory oversight and governing 
technological innovation. 16  
 
Similar discursive tropes depicting an inevitable teleology towards the contemporary state of 
affairs are found in Chinese elite discourse concerning the SREB. However, in contrast to 
Putin’s post-imperial emphasis on unity, Xi’s legitimating narrative of ‘connectivity’ 
reinforces the idea of co-operation among independent sovereign states. As reflected in Xi’s 
discourse, the project is marketed as an open and inclusive project: any state with an interest in 
the initiative – or in one of the institutions summarized under the BRI – can become part of it.  
As Jones and Zeng argue, this openness is driven by the need for generating new markets for 
the surplus capacity of Chinese industry, primarily its state-owned enterprises.17   
 
Chinese President Xi Jinping first presented the idea in a 2013 speech at Nazarbayev University 
in Astana, Kazakhstan. His address is couched in banal nationalist discourse that positions his 
contemporary agenda as a form of historical continuity: ‘Today, as I stand here and look back 
at [the establishment of the ancient silk road], I could almost hear the camel bells echoing in 
the mountains and see the wisp of smoke rising from the desert’.18 However, the strategy paper 
released in 2015, Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-
Century Maritime Silk Road, indicated that the precedent on which SREB was based was not 
long-lived friendship but commercial and investment interests of SOEs dating from the era of 
Deng Xiaoping. 19   The plan was the post hoc gloss covering diverse and competing 
infrastructure and investment projects. Depending on how ‘Central Asia’ is understood, 





In his opening address at the Belt and Road Forum in May 2017, Xi Jinping linked the BRI 
both to the Chinese silk roads that crossed Eurasia during antiquity and to a new China-led 
model of global development spanning policy spheres ranging from infrastructure development 
and technological innovation to environmental protection and cultural exchange. Xi attributes 
an array of projects across Eurasia and South East Asia, many of which had long been in the 
offing, to BRI. These include Indonesia’s high speed rail programme has been under 
consideration since before 2010, and contracts for the construction of the Addis Ababa – 
Djibouti railway were awarded to two Chinese SOEs in 2011.  Other activity associated with 
the 11 routes and corridors dates back to the late-1980s.21   
 
While the two visions of Eurasian integration emerge from very different economic and 
historical contexts they both possess a centred discourse of grand strategy, which feature two 
common elements.  First, a claim to strong historical continuity from which both projects are 
portrayed to derive their legitimacy, and second, a strong emphasis on central coherence.22 
These two claims are performative.  In the case of Russia, this discourse feeds into what 
Stefanie Ortmann has termed ‘the myth of the strong state’,  where spectacular international 
performances of Russian stateness during the 2000s are best seen as a process of state-building, 
rather than a coherent geopolitical strategy.23 Arguably, the same can be said for China, keen 
to be seen as the champion of developing countries and to regain lost status after the colonial 
encounters of the 19th Century.  However, a focus on great power discourse alone cannot make 
sense of state transformation processes, which are constituted through everyday practices of 
interaction, subversion and contestation that take place far from the centre’s reach, and remain 






2. Decentred Rising Powers and Postcolonial International Relations 
 We advance a relational account of rising powers as decentred actors that employ postcolonial 
practices of mimicry and mētis.  This decentred approach is not particular to postcolonial 
spaces or rising powers but a long-standing and more general critique.  Accelerated via 
processes of globalisation, these processes of decentring may be observed in states of the global 
North and South, in both great powers and small.25  Here, power is not a quantifiable entity, as 
traditionalists claim, but is dispersed across agencies, institutions, and individuals and 
produced through interactions among them.  
 
Hameiri and Jones observe that, ‘the central state shifted from a “command and control” model 
based on direct intervention to secure economic, social and political objectives to a “regulatory” 
model, whereby central government merely sets broad targets and regulations for diverse public 
and private actors’.26 As a result, policy areas formerly administered by government have been 
displaced by a diversity of actors, including domestic and multi-national corporations, charities 
and citizens groups, and semi-independent agencies.27 Our account maps how parts of the state, 
industry and business create transnational and international connections that exist in dialogical 
relationship with the foreign policymaking by central governments. As we elaborate below, a 
postcolonial move reveals how actors associated with rising powers’ centres in Moscow and 
Beijing employ formal mimicry in their discursive and institutional emulation of established 
powers, substantive mimicry in the subversive or hybrid meanings and identities they 
frequently attach to these new institutions, and practical mētis (cunning, evasion) at the 
everyday level.28   In turn, relations between risers and fallers, powerful patrons and their 
clients, dominant discourses and practices, between institutions and individuals, must be at 





The structure of both Chinese and Russian state bureaucracies bear hallmarks of 
decentralization, internationalization and fragmentation.  In the Chinese case, Hameiri and 
Jones argue that as central government implemented policies of fiscal decentralisation and 
deregulation to facilitate global economic integration, subnational agencies, institutions and 
companies in the public and private sectors have increasingly developed autonomous interests 
with a transnational dimension, and have become difficult for central government to manage.29 
The consequence of this shift in statehood leads indirectly to its promotion elsewhere: ‘as 
China’s economy expands beyond its borders, so does the “governance frontier” of its state 
apparatuses’.30  
 
In the Russian case, the state initially appears much more centred on a new patronal form of 
rule as Putin brought the oligarchs who dominated particular economic sectors under control 
after 2000, 31  reigning in the ‘paradiplomacy’ that had been widespread under Yeltsin. 32 
However, internationalizing and fragmenting trends, driven by the kleptocratic networks of 
Putin and his inner circle,33 continue alongside Putin’s purported efforts to restore Russia as a 
‘Great Power’ or Velikaya Derzhava.34   Global assemblages of the international financial 
system – particularly the linkage to secretive ‘offshore’ jurisdictions – were instrumental to 
this process as witnessed in the Russian state’s former Soviet clients in Central Asia35 and in 
the transformation of its organised crime networks into transnational business actors.36 
 
The practices by which power relations are produced in regional contexts are no less 
entrenched in legacies of imperialism and colonialism (of either the aristocratic-mercantilist or 
state socialist kind). The recent turn towards a practice-based approach to IR is consistent with 
a postcolonial optic. ‘World politics,’ Adler and Pouliot argue, ‘can be understood as structured 




and are reproduced, changed, and reinforced by international action and interaction’. 37 
Curiously, Adler and Pouliot’s volume contains no references to postcoloniality, despite the 
fact that properly global relations between former imperial centres and formally decolonized 
states and peoples scream of the vestiges of empire in almost every act.  Postcolonies are also 
‘global performance states’ in so far as their elites demand recognition of their distinctive 
claims to sovereignty at the same time as they imitate or parody former imperial powers in their 
everyday international relations.38  
 
In earlier work, Owen, Heathershaw and Savin constructed a practice-based account of the 
production of power between dominant and subordinate actors in post-Western settings, 
deploying two concepts drawn from postcolonial theory – Bhabha’s concept of mimicry39 and 
Scott’s notion of mētis40 – to conceptualise the ways in which imperial or hegemonic practices 
are challenged, reproduced or subverted by subordinate actors at formal and informal levels.41 
The essay argued that, following L.H.M. Ling, two levels of mimicry are discernible: ‘formal 
mimicry’ comprises superficial copying, while ‘substantive mimicry’ indicates a more 
profound engagement that foments a hybrid set of practices and subjectivities.42  Following 
Scott, mētis was conceptualised as everyday practices of subversion, enacted through ‘common 
sense, experience, a knack’.  A broad concept, it is best observed at the local level, from elegant 
craftsmanship to schemes for kleptocracy, in attempts to maintain virtue and attempts to exploit 
it.43  
 
Bringing this work on practices of mimicry and mētis together with an ontology of the 
decentred state, we can formulate a relational account of rising power. In this view, a rising 
power relationship is one where formal and substantive mimicry occur in the performance of 




practices produce mētis, even if these effectively undermine official international agendas.  The 
radical claim is that the two processes, which appear to work against one another, are entirely 
consistent providing we accept that power is not a commodity, but a relationship. This allows 
us to make theoretical sense of how the USA and EU have been relatively ineffective in Central 
Asia compared to Russia and China: it is not about what power their central governments 
possess but how they build relationships of public performance and mutually beneficial 
practices of private enrichment via statecraft at the margins.  The following two sections 
explore this thesis, first, in the Russian case and, second, in the Chinese case. 
 
3. Russian Decentred Practices in Central Asia: Rusal’s struggles and the EAEU 
Globally, the Kremlin’s claims to Russia’s rising power status relies upon the public 
performance by state apparatus of its post-imperial hegemony in its so-called ‘near abroad’, 
including in Central Asia.  This performance is also entertained by local actors who produce 
power through shared norms and understandings: as Ortmann writes, ‘insofar as Russian power 
is pervasive and persuasive, it is because the Kyrgyz – state elites and population – are actively 
involved in its perpetuation.’ 44  Post-Soviet Central Asian governments formally mimic 
Russian laws and join Russian-led institutions, reproducing the ‘post-Soviet’ regional 
identity.45  
 
Our first example considers Russia’s relationship with post-Soviet Tajikistan, which has 
typically been interpreted by Western geopolitical commentators as one centred on grand 
strategy, geopolitical competition and national interests. Yet, our research shows that key 
episodes in national-level Russian-Tajik relations have been driven more by mimicry and mētis 
between the countries’ business and political elites than by grand strategy.46  When Vladimir 




in July 2004, it seemed that an international grand bargain had prioritised the return of the  
Russian-owned United Company Rusal into the Tajik aluminium industry ahead of its Western 
rivals.  This deal also included the transfer of Tajikistan’s southern border from Russian to 
Tajik control, the status of Russia’s space observation centre in Nurek and Tajikistan’s debt to 
Russia.  The agreement concerning the Tajik Aluminium Company (Talco) was especially 
important for Rahmon and his allies since he was intending to replace the previous management 
– and their offshore arrangement via the BVI registered company Ansol – with family members, 
their business allies and a new offshore set-up. Following an August 2004 meeting between 
Rusal’s head Deripaska and Rahmon, they apparently conspired to expel Ansol from its 
partnership with Talco (which, as stated in a subsequent high court ruling, was unlikely to be 
for Talco’s benefit since it was probably operating at a ‘significant loss’). 47   The new 
arrangement was ordered by a presidential decree of 23 December 2004, allowing the 
ownership of aluminium to be transferred from Talco to an offshore company known as ‘CDH’. 
I  In return Talco received a small tolling fee for its work in processing the alumina.48   
 
What appeared to be a geopolitical triumph for the Russian leadership was actually driven not 
by traditional geopolitics, but by highly decentred relations and practices.  The mētis of Rusal, 
which had emerged from the Soviet state entities that had built the Tajik smelter in 1975, and 
which had been trading with Tajikistan as a private company since 1996, had been instrumental 
in the company’s triumph over its Western rival.  Offshore companies with which Rusal had 
been in trading relations for nearly a decade provided the basis for new gate-keeping relations 
and rent-seeking practices.  The deal was also highly contingent on the approval of patronal 
networks, regardless of what had been formally agreed between Putin and Rahmon. By early 
2005, the new arrangement had already begun to sour with the Government of Tajikistan’s 





In 2006, Talco shifted partners again, this time with Norway’s Hydro Aluminium – part of 
Norsk Hydro, a conglomerate whose majority shareholder is the Government of Norway. This 
was an interim arrangement that would precipitate a full reorganization of Tajikistan’s major 
state industry via offshores vehicles.  After a June 2006 settlement between Talco and Hydro, 
the latter became Talco’s principal partner, ousting its rival Rusal.  An agreement signed in 
Dushanbe on 20 December 2006 committed Hydro to longer-term investment and a possible 
tripling of the production capacity of the Soviet-era plant.49   Thus, despite Russian-Tajik 
diplomatic relations reaching the height of the Sochi deal of 2004, the most significant Russian 
investment in Tajikistan was breaking down.  After 2006, Rusal’s struggle with Talco and the 
Tajik state continued in international courts of arbitration for at least a further eight years as 
Rusal subsidiaries eventually succeeded – via the New York court room in 2014 – in forcing 
open the accounts of the Tajik offshore companies and causing disruption in Russian-Tajik 
relations.50 This case suggests that, in so far as the Russian government retains leverage over 
its Tajikistani counterpart, it is as much due to these global and decentred practices involving 
Russian and Tajik elites in courts and business meetings as it is in the bilateral deals and 
projections of power from the Kremlin.   
 
These practices of mimicry and mētis continue to be constitutive of Russia’s relations in 
Central Asia.  Consider the Kremlin’s efforts to enhance Russia’s ‘rising power’ status by 
establishing the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). The EAEU is widely seen as formally 
modelled on the European Union, although its content, or practices, differ substantially.51 It 
can therefore be seen as a textbook example of institutional mimicry. Indeed, Putin himself 
refers to the EU as an important model for the project.52  At the same time, it comprises 




Russia engages in ‘normative rivalry’ with the EU – an attempt to lure post-Soviet states away 
from the EU’s westernising influence.53 In the words of Russian scholar, Alexander Lukin, ‘If 
the countries of Europe united to champion the values of democracy, human rights, and 
economic cooperation, then a Eurasian union must stand for its own ideals, too.’54  
 
Despite the creation of numerous supranational co-ordinating bodies, an integrated economic 
zone via the EAEU has not materialised, 55  and intra-regional trade and investment has 
declined.56 Reports show that Kyrgyzstan has seen a near 20% fall in trade turnover with other 
EAEU member states, ostensibly due to poor regional economic conditions, while the 
competitiveness of Russian products in member states’ markets has diminished.57 As Dragneva 
and Wolczuk argue, ‘The poor governance characterizing [EAEU] member states, including 
Russia, creates a formidable obstacle to the effective functioning of the union as a rules-based 
regime’.58 The point here is not that the EAEU has simply been poorly implemented, but that 
it was both preceded and is shaped by a basket of institutional and substantive mimicries and 
everyday practices of mētis, ensuring that it would not take the coherent form centred on state 
parties that was envisaged in its treaties and surrounding political discourse.  Similar arguments 
have been made with regard to the CSTO, where Russian officials have demanded 
unquestioning loyalty rather than functional strategic cooperation.59  
 
The run-up to the signing of the foundational EAEU Treaty on May 29, 2014, was characterized 
by Russian negotiators offering various concessions – both exemptions within the treaty and 
as bilateral side payments – to other prospective members.  Accordingly, even though Russian 
officials went to great lengths to present the EAEU as a typical regional Russian-led Eurasian 
integration effort, securing agreement to the foundational treaty was predicated on offering 




President Alexander Lukashenko only agreed to sign the treaty after he was given assurances 
that Minsk would keep 50% of duties it used to transfer to Russia for re-exporting oil products, 
based on subsidized Russian oil, to third countries. 60  Armenia was awarded continued 
discounts on Russian gas imports and over 900 exemptions on tariffs of politically-sensitive 
consumer goods.61 Kyrgyzstan was also offered a number of inducements, including writing 
off a $300 million in bilateral debt and accessing a special $1 billion development fund, 
allocated by the Russian federal budget (comprised of $500 million in grants and $500 million 
in concessionary loans), which reportedly went directly went to the National Bank of 
Kyrgyzstan.62 This financing made the Russian Federation the country’s leading bilateral donor 
and, according to the fund’s public statements, 63  has supported projects including the 
renovation of Manas international airport and the construction of a hydro power plant, both 
sectors that have been marred by graft scandals. 
 
In sum, while in the Kremlin’s discourse the Russian state may appear as highly centred and 
strategic actor, when ‘Moscow’ does act, it is often not according to official Kremlin strategy 
but in the form of profoundly decentred state-owned enterprises that operate across informal 
and cross-regional business networks.64  
 
4. Chinese Decentred Practices in Central Asia: CNPC, CDB and the BRI’s expansion 
In this final section, we argue that China’s rise in Central Asia demonstrates processes of both 
mimicry and mētis.  However, given China’s relative independence from Western norms and 
institutions compared to Russia, we find fewer instances of mimicry of either formal or 
substantive kinds.  Nevertheless, traces of substantive mimicry may be found in China’s use of 
bilateral investments and international financial institutions to reshape economic norms and fill 




local partners to invest in the region and push Beijing to post hoc rationalization in the form of 
SREB announcements. 66  While Chinese government discourse emphasises ‘win-win’ co-
operation via a centrally controlled development strategy, the increasing autonomy of Chinese 
SOEs render local practices of bribery and corruption endemic to Chinese projects in 
neighbouring countries, including in Central Asia.67 The win-win here appears to be primarily 
for networks of Chinese and Central Asian business elites. 
 
Multiple cases of Chinese investments and infrastructure projects both before and after the 
announcement of SREB/BRI suggest that Chinese-sponsored development in Central Asia 
builds graft opportunities for Chinese and local elites into the templates of their legitimate 
financial agreements. Road building, for example, provides the classic model of corruption in 
Central Asia.  The Dushanbe-Chanak highway in Tajikistan was built with Chinese funding 
and opened in 2010 with its toll booths operated by an offshore-registered company, Innovative 
Road Solutions, with no previous history of highway projects and which was estimated to be 
funnelling $25-$30 Million per annum into accounts whose beneficiaries were members of the 
government’s inner circle. 68   Similarly, in June 2018, local investigative reporting in 
Kyrgyzstan revealed that an $850 Million BRI project under the Export-Import (Exim) Bank 
of China to build a new North-South highway was riddled with corruption schemes where 
Kyrgyz ministers colluded with the Chinese contractor to ensure that over-payments were built 
into the project.69  Both before and after the BRI announcement, it appears that pay-offs to 
local elites are central to Chinese strategy in Central Asia.   
 
More emerging evidence about the financial and commercial structuring of BRI projects 
suggests that these centring and decentring aspects can also inter-relate.  In 2018, former 




redevelopment of Bishkek’s power plant by Chinese company Tebian Electric Apparatus Stock 
Co. Ltd. (TBEA) which deprived thousands of residents of heating over the especially cold 
winter of 2017/18.  There had been no tender process for the $386 Million contract financed 
via China’s EximBank. 70   ‘The choice of TBEA,’ Isakov explained in his parliamentary 
testimony, before his forced resignation, ‘was the official position from China and we could 
not change this.’71  However, TBEA contracted the Kyrgyz private company Electrical Stations, 
paying fees for goods far in excess of their market value, thereby enabling $100 Million of 
embezzlement for Kyrgyz as well as Chinese business, while failing to adequately invest in 
chemical treatment units that were necessary for the operation of the plant’s boilers.72  In 
Kyrgyzstan, where investigative journalism and active civil society survive, the controversy 
continues with former President Almaz Atambaev now accused.73   
 
For Chinese business there may be strategic payoff from these micro practices. Such inflated 
contracts create the risk of greater dependency on China as creditor, thereby fuelling China’s 
rise through debt diplomacy, as some recipients of BRI investments become insolvent due to 
their repayment obligations.74  In Tajikistan, for example, the government repaid its debt to 
TBEA for the redevelopment of the Dushanbe-2 power plant by handing over a gold mine to 
the contractor.75 Chinese leaders have demonstrated substantive mimicry of Western financial 
practices in their justifications, lamenting, ‘It is unreasonable that money coming out of 
Western countries is praised as good and sweet, while coming out of China it's sinister and a 
trap’.76 Such counter arguments are reasonable in that it is Chinese private companies that 
appear to be the primary beneficiaries of recipient states’ indebtedness in Central Asia.  It is a 





What is at the top of the Chinese agenda in Central Asia is development of the region’s oil and 
gas.77  China has built major new energy pipelines in Central Asia that have transformed the 
region’s export infrastructure away from its previous colonial orientation towards Russia, 
notably an oil pipeline traversing Kazakhstan and a network of gas connectors, known as 
China-Central Asia pipeline, that transports gas from Turkmenistan, through Uzbekistan and 
Kazakhstan before crossing into Xinjiang to flow into Chinese East-West pipeline.78 Between 
2002 and 2012, Chinese oil companies went on a spending boom overseas, making more than 
150 deals and over $120 billion worth of investments to acquire a variety of overseas 
holdings.79 The financial crisis of 2008-09 was an important marker, as it ushered in numerous 
new overseas acquisitions and loans-for-energy agreements between China and cash-strapped 
Eurasian and Latin American governments.80  The foremost agent in these projects has been 
China National Petroleum Company (CNPC), a state-owned enterprise and the country’s 
largest energy company), whose subsidiary Petrochina is the world’s fourth largest oil 
producer.81   
 
This new energy infrastructure has been accompanied by a set of major loans-for energy deals 
via China Development Bank (CDB)  that have made China an important regional investor and 
creditor.82 The Turkmen-China gas pipeline, in particular, has turned Turkmenistan into a 
critical exporter for Beijing and has vaulted CNPC over the Russian giant Gazprom, formerly 
the regional monopolist, as Central Asia’s main gas producer and distributor. A great deal of 
CNPC’s projects in Central Asia have been financed via the CDB which has funnelled state 
development funds to assist in acquisition of overseas energy assets.83  In Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan, loans from the CDB were used to structure deals worth $8 billion and $10bn (to 
become $13bn in 2013 when CNPC also acquired a stake in the large Kashagan international 




supplies and shares in Kazakh energy companies in return. In January 2018, the bank 
announced that it would commit $250Bn to projects associated with BRI.84   
 
However, these vital trans-regional energy projects are no less prone to graft opportunities 
between elites.  In 2013, Chinese authorities launched an unprecedented crackdown and 
investigation of corruption in CNPC. The investigation had touched upon the company’s 
overseas activities in Turkmenistan (among other overseas locations), and had implicated two 
major executives who had previously headed major subsidiaries in Central Asia, including, 
Liao Yongyuan, former vice-president of PetroChina, who in 2017 was convicted and 
sentenced to 15 years in prison on corruption charges.85 That the Chinese government itself 
seeks to stamp out corrupt activities demonstrates that such practices are not part of a 
coordinated grand scheme by Beijing; rather, they constitute practices of mētis, operating at 
the local limits of the reach of central state organs. 
 
Much of these rents are gathered by political elites in Central Asia who serve as gate-keepers 
to China’s BRI.  This role is exemplified in CNPC’s deal to acquire one of Kazakhstan’s largest 
energy companies, Aktobe MunaiGaz. A Wall Street Journal investigation, based on materials 
and allegations originally made by exiled political dissident Mukhtar Ablyazov and published 
in Kazakh independent newspapers, found that the 2003 acquisition of Aktobe by CNPC had 
been mediated by a holding company registered in the British Virgin Islands, CNPC 
International Caspian Limited (CICL).86 CICL’s start-up capital was reportedly just $100, 
while it proceeded to sell at a later date a 49% stake (for 49$) to yet another BVI-registered 
company Darley Investment Services. Over the next 2 years, CNPC bought back Darley’s 




enormous profit from the company’s initial $49 outlay. According to the report, the structured 
deal yielded a $150 million payoff to a business partner of the President’s son-in-law.87 
 
How might we assess these cases in light of our decentred, relational ontology and our 
interpretive concepts of mimicry and mētis?    In heuristic terms, government actors and SOEs 
deploy mimicry in their business culture, whereby they appeal to internationally accepted 
norms of financial conduct, while the brokers and deal-makers employ mētis in the financial 
transactions themselves.  ‘Knack’ and ‘local knowledge’ is found in the marrying of the inner 
knowledge of clientelistic networks with the technical knowledge of transnational finance and 
the ability to circumvent the anti-money laundering laws to which it is putatively subject.  A 
decentred but still elitist approach to China’s rise in Central Asia helps us see that ‘corruption’ 
is not a bump on the road but part of the infrastructure built in to BRI projects – in spite of 
Beijing’s efforts to eliminate it – and demonstrates the way in which local power flows through 
these networks.  This decentred perspective recognises that one grandiose pronouncement of a 
singular $1 Trillion global scheme is less significant than the thousand times one hundred 
million dollars is stolen in specific places and times across the globe.  When we move beyond 
the centred discourse and hierarchical relations promulgated by rising powers, we may see 
these acts of embezzlement and graft as productive of networked relations and horizontal 
between transnational elites and sovereign debt dependencies between states. 
 
Conclusion 
We have sought to demonstrate that the two dynamics of mimicry and mētis are central to any 
study of the rise and fall of powers.  We have taken our examples from over a 15-year period 
to demonstrate the continuity in these practices and the fact that they precede the EAEU and 




(as in Rusal and Talco in 2005-2006) and at times sufficiently stable as to be co-constitutive of 
rise (as in the case of CNPC, CDB and the BRI over the last decade).  The concepts of mimicry 
and mētis apply at the levels of both institutional design and everyday trade and investment 
practice to elaborate the processes of state transformation identified by Jones and Hameiri with 
respect to global governance.  But an explanation of whether they work for or against the rise 
of an aspiring great power may be found in the extent to which they achieve the buy-in of elite 
networks rather than satisfy their putative national interests.  Grand strategy may give the 
appearance of a highly centred and traditional geopolitics.  However, in practice, both mimicry 
and mētis generate dynamics where the margins of EAEU and BRI matter as much as their 
centres.   
 
Greater research in the form of ethnographies of transnational finance and multinational 
enterprises are required to properly evidence the nature and scale of rising power in decentred 
terms.  Anthropological research has taken this de-centred approach further by considering 
Central Asian-Chinese trade as a mode of ‘everyday diplomacy’88 which contrasts with the 
‘romantic visions of interconnectivity fashioned by elites which gather in international hotels’. 
In fact, argues Marsden, ‘it is in the markets and bazaars in which commerce and exchange 
actually take place where connectivity is actually fashioned’.89 By shifting our optic to the 
decentred relations of political elites we can see the rent-seeking opportunities which are 
invariably built into these projects but are, for obvious reasons, difficult to observe.  Such 
mechanisms connect local patron-client relations to transnational financial processes and their 
offshore vehicles.  These decentring process are not only the means by which powers rise but 
themselves constitute the rising.  In this sense, ‘rising powers’ are vehicles for the enrichment 
of new global networks of elites.  Their rises are themselves contingent upon discourses which 




political status and personal wealth.  We must stop thinking of rising powers as concentrations 
of power and begin effectively conceiving them as relations of power which flow through 
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